This monthly review, produced by IOM, provides a summary of news related to the implementation of the Peace Accord in Colombia, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Also included are statistics on people in the process of reintegration and former child soldiers, with information provided by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).

**Reported cases of forced recruitment since 1999**
- Total: **7,518**
  (1 September)

**Total disengaged since 1999**
- Since 1999: **6,526**
- Fiscal year to date: **115**
- This month: **14**
- Currently enrolled in program: **267**

**Disengagement by department**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chocó</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caquetá</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Santander</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arauca</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putumayo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauca</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nariño</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Since 1999**
- **MALE** 71%
- **FEMALE** 29%

**August 2018** (This month)
- **MALE** 50%
- **FEMALE** 50%

**Ethnicity**
- **MESTIZO** 93%
- **AFRO-COLombian** 7%
- **INDIGENOUS** 0%

**Age**
- 9 TO 12: 28%
- 13: 21%
- 14: 29%
- 15: 21%
- 16: 21%
- 17: 17%
- 18: 9%

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) processes**
- **BACRIM** 4%
- **UNKNOWN** 2%
- **FARC** 60%
- **ELN** 17%
- **AUC** 16%
- **OTHER GROUPS** 2%
- **FARC** 38%
- **ELN** 46%
- **BACRIM** 13%
- **OTHER GROUPS** 3%
- **FARC** 50%
- **ELN** 43%
- **BACRIM** 7%
- **OTHER GROUPS** 0%
DEMOLIZED ADULTS

Total currently in reintegration process: 8,425

Total disengaged since 1999
- This month: 48
- Fiscal year to date: 639
- Since 1999: 60,194

State of all participants

Since 1999
- 1,453 (2%) Not able to locate
- 5,467 (9%) Not yet part of program
- 8,425 (14%) In process
- 16,379 (27%) Formally removed
- 22,278 (37%) Successfully Completed
- 6,191 (10%) Deaths

Demobilization by department (top 8)

This month:
- Bogotá: 7
- Antioquia: 9
- Santander: 4
- Meta: 4
- Arauca: 5
- Valle: 7
- Cesar: 3
- Chocó: 2

Armed group

Since 1999
- FARC 32%
- AUC 60%
- BACRIM 26%
- ELN 7%
- Other groups 1%

Fiscal year to date
- FARC 41%
- ELN 28%
- BACRIM 26%
- Other groups 5%

This month
- FARC 13%
- ELN 44%
- BACRIM 35%
- Other groups 8%

Since 1999

Gender
- Male 87%
- Female 13%

August 2018 (This month)
- Male 85%
- Female 15%

Ethnicity
- Mestizo 90%
- Afro-Colombian 5%
- Indigenous 2%
- Other 3%

Type of demobilization
- Collective 54%
- Individual 46%

Current occupation
- Unemployed 9%
- Employed in formal sector 22%
- Employed in informal sector 48%
- Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc) 21%

* those who have died or who are without occupational registry are not included
The new President reached the Casa de Nariño with a record number of votes following an Uribe-backed campaign which proposed significant changes to the Peace Accord with the FARC. His rival Gustavo Petro also received a record number of votes for a leftist candidate, and will lead a strengthened opposition in favor of the Peace Accord. It is the first time a woman has become vice president.

The figure surpassed the 2017 total, with the situation becoming particularly critical in the Pacific coastal region, Catatumbo, and the Bajo Cauca of Antioquia, where there are intense confrontations between the ELN, EPL, FARC dissidents, and paramilitary groups. Despite comprising 90% of victims of the armed conflict, internally displaced persons (IDP) often go unrecognized, and many seek refuge in informal and marginalized settlements where they do not have access to basic rights and are prey to illegal armed groups. Rodeemos la Paz has made recommendations to the Truth Commission on engaging refugees and exiles, given that Colombia is the Latin American country with the most citizens forcibly living abroad, totaling more than half a million refugees.

The Court outlined several clarifications, including the three types of sentences available to the JEP (its own, alternative, and ordinary), the use of which will depend on defendants recognizing their responsibility and telling the truth, and will affect their political participation. The Court also confirmed the JEP’s power to defer the extradition of former guerrillas and declared that sexual crimes will fall within its remit.

The four changes cover the removal of the connection between rebellion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking; limiting the political participation of those convicted of crimes against humanity; removing benefits for those who continue trafficking weapons, laundering, and drug trafficking; and the obligatory eradication of illicit crops. These issues are unlikely to affect former FARC guerrillas, but will be relevant to the ELN.

In addition to the kidnapping of nine people in Antioquia/Chocó and Arauca, the recruitment of 24 children and adolescents in Chocó over the past six months was also confirmed. President Duque announced he will only continue negotiations with the ELN if the group ceases its kidnappings, extortions, assassinations, and attacks on oil infrastructure and security forces. The release of hostages is being negotiated separately from the Havana peace talks, which ended on 1 August and are currently being evaluated by President Duque’s new government.
In this report, Fundación Ideas para la Paz identifies the key security challenges facing Iván Duque’s new Government, including those presented by the presence, alliances, and disputes between illegal armed groups converging on Colombia’s borders. The report not only covers the issue of ‘cross-border contagion’ but also the effects that the internal dynamics of each country could have on Colombia, and civilian and migrant populations.

To see an interactive map of Colombia’s borders click here.

Border insecurity, violence, and illegal economies

The key premise of this piece of research is that civilian third parties should also be required to give evidence before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). The authors argue that individual economic actors should be considered within this transitional justice mechanism not simply to punish them, but rather to involve them in collective peacebuilding through the sharing of the full truth and reparations in return for reduced or alternative sentences. They base this argument on an analysis of the legal fragmentation caused by the omission of these third parties from the Justice and Peace Law created to facilitate the demobilization of paramilitary groups after 2005, which in turn caused gaps in victims’ right to the truth and reparations. They also make particular reference to experiences of para-politics and land restitution processes in Colombia.