This monthly review, produced by IOM, provides a summary of news related to the implementation of the Peace Accord in Colombia, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Also included are statistics on people in the process of reintegration and former child soldiers, with information provided by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).

**Reported cases of forced recruitment since 1999**

- Total: **7,566**
  - Since 1999: **6,570**
  - This year: **159**
  - This month: **25**
  - Currently enrolled in program: **252**

**Total disengaged since 1999**

- Since 1999: **6,570**
- This year: **159**
- This month: **25**
- Currently enrolled in program: **252**

**Disengagement by department**

Since 1999:

- FARC 60%
- ELN 18%
- AUC 16%
- BACRIM 4%
- OTHER GROUPS 2%

This year:

- FARC 37%
- ELN 46%
- BACRIM 14%
- OTHER GROUPS 3%

This month:

- FARC 40%
- ELN 44%
- BACRIM 14%
- OTHER GROUPS 2%

**October 2018 (This month)**

- MALE 68%
- FEMALE 32%
- MALE 71%
- FEMALE 29%

**Sex**

**Ethnicity**

- MESTIZO 82%
- AFRO-COLOMBIAN 7%
- INDIGENOUS 11%

- MESTIZO 64%
- INDIGENOUS 28%
- OTHER GROUPS 8%

**Age**

- 9 TO 12 38%
- 13 28%
- 14 17%
- 15 16%
- 16 16%
- 17 20%
- 18 20%
# DEMOBILIZED ADULTS

**Total currently in reintegration process:**
- **7,359**

**Total disengaged since 1999**
- **This month:** 56
- **This year:** 761
- **Since 1999:** 60,275

## State of all participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th>Ocean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not able to locate</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet part of program</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td><strong>9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In process</td>
<td>7,359</td>
<td><strong>12%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formally removed</td>
<td>16,664</td>
<td><strong>28%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successfully completed</td>
<td>23,446</td>
<td><strong>39%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>6,253</td>
<td><strong>10%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Demobilization by Department (top 11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>This month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlántico</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santander Norte</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santander</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyacá</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nariño</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaviare</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santander</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Armed group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FARC 32%</td>
<td>AUC 60%</td>
<td>BACRIM 27%</td>
<td>OTHER GROUPS 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This year</td>
<td>FARC 39%</td>
<td>ELN 30%</td>
<td>BACRIM 27%</td>
<td>OTHER GROUPS 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This month</td>
<td>FARC 36%</td>
<td>ELN 46%</td>
<td>BACRIM 18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Current occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current occupation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in formal sector</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in informal sector</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc)</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* those who have died or who are without occupational registry are not included
The force will join the 12,000 soldiers in the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander. Human Rights defenders and civilian authorities recognize the State’s efforts to regain security, but also highlight the need for non-military responses to the social and humanitarian situation.

The open letter sent by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) on 6 October claimed that the ordinary justice system is interfering in the autonomous, and constitutionally recognized, jurisdiction’s processes. Amid the controversy, 31 former FARC leaders being investigated in Case 001 (kidnapping and forced disappearances), will request protection measures before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and will go to the UN Special Rapporteur on Justice in Geneva to ensure that the Accord and JEP are respected. Members of the SPC have called on the GOC, United Nations, and International Criminal Court to defend the JEP against abuses, citing a raid on the court’s facilities during which the AGO obtained a digital copy of Case 001. On 18 October, the JEP issued the AGO and the GOC with a 3-day limit to provide information on FARC assets seized, being investigated, or delivered for victims’ reparation. The AG, however, has repeatedly refused to deliver detailed information.

The JEP’s Investigation and Prosecution Unit (UIA) has received reports on 2,300 cases of sexual violence during the armed conflict, information which will inform the identification of patterns of abuse, those responsible, their contributions to truth, and their legal situation. Those failing to tell the truth will be investigated by the JEP. Until now, these cases fell within the ordinary justice system’s jurisdiction, where only 2% of them come to trial. The Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition Integrated System provides a new mechanism for more than 15,000 cases to come to justice, but armed actors have routinely denied the use of sexual violence.

Centro Democrático (CD) congresspeople, one of whom is being investigated for suspected witness tampering, proposed limits to the JEP, Truth Commission (TC), and Missing Persons Search Unit’s access to military information on 18 October, suggesting that this would risk national security. In response, the director of the TC, Father Francisco de Roux, denounced the motion for violating victims’ right to the truth and contradicting Constitutional Court rulings and the TC’s founding Decree. The Interior and Defense Ministers supported CD-proposed reforms to the JEP which would create special courts for the military to be judged by different magistrates to the FARC.

A letter from “Ivan Márquez,” “El Paisa,” “Romaña,” and other FARC leaders confirmed their commitment to the peace process on 28 October,11 but also criticized the AG’s “sabotage” of the JEP and Peace Accord. The AGO later delivered evidence in the Jesús Santrich case, including audios from the case against Marlon Marín for corruption involving post-conflict resources which appear to implicate Santrich in cocaine trafficking. The JEP also requested evidence held in the United States. The case has generated debate over the reach of transitional justice.

The JEP heard “oral reports” from high-ranking politicians, police officers, and military forces kidnapped for hostage exchange by the FARC on 28 October. Several victims made demands for truth in four areas: the lack of security measures available to them when kidnapped; the participation of non-combatant third parties in planning kidnappings; the location of people who were kidnapped and disappeared; and Presidents Pastrana and Uribe’s refusal to negotiate a humanitarian exchange for their release.
In this report, the National Center for Historic Memory (CNMH) attends to the call for the construction of memory with a territorial approach, and seeks to make visible the ways in which the armed conflict has differentially impacted each territory, in this case the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander. The CNMH seeks to both create spaces for dialogue on conflict and resistance lived in the region, and to share this with the Colombian public more widely, thus contributing to territorial peacebuilding.29

Catatumbo: Memories of life and dignity

Concerns responded to the lack of technical, financial, and legal clarity for the implementation of Development Plans with a Territorial and Ethnic Approach (PDET) created by the Peace Accord as part of reparations for 170 municipalities directly affected by the armed conflict. To date, nine of the 16 PDET areas have reached the sub-regional level of organization, and the Territorial Renovation Agency (ART) aims to complete the rest by the end of the year before structuring each action plan. However, there are no resources or official route defined for this next phase. 26 Violent deaths in PDET municipalities also increased by 28%, forced displacement tripled from 5,248 to 16,997 cases, and attacks against social leaders increased from 24 to 67 between January and July 2018, as compared with the same period in 2017.27 The director of the Victim’s Unit, Ramón Rodríguez, acknowledged that all those affected by the conflict will not be compensated before the Victims’ Law expires in 2021.28

Over 8-12 October, UN partners from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK visited several projects with PBF funding for victims’ reparations, the reincorporation of former combatants, and territorial stabilization to better understand how they have been implemented, as well as the challenges they face. The PBF has been an important donor for peace since 2014, contributing US$ 15 million to these projects through the UN Post-Conflict Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Colombia.24

In agreement with the UN Secretary General’s report delivered on 28 September, the UN Security Council noted the positive developments towards the implementation of the Peace Accord since Iván Duque took office, including the reactivation of the Verification Commission (CSIVI) and the National Reincorporation Council (CNR). However, the Council also highlighted their concerns with regards continuing insecurity, drug trafficking, and violence, as well as the assassinations of community and social leaders. They also reiterated the importance of the full political, legal, and socio-economic reincorporation of former FARC combatants, showing concern with regards the assassinations of former combatants and the need to promote socioeconomic opportunities and legal and security guarantees. The Council will continue to support Colombia’s new government in the implementation of the Peace Accord and the building of a lasting peace, and called on the international community to do the same.23

The ELN also mentioned the intensified operations against them under Iván Duque, seeing them as an effort to undermine their negotiating position.14 The GOC has repeatedly called for the release of hostages and cessation of illegal activities as a prerequisite for the resumption of talks.15 The two sides implemented a 101-day ceasefire between October 2017 and January 2018, and the ELN implemented a ceasefire over the legislative and presidential elections this year, but are implicated in continuing displacements16 and kidnappings in Catatumbo17 and Arauca,20 the recruitment of minors in Chocó,21 and the murder of three geologists in Antioquia.22

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