## DDR AND CHILD SOLDIER ISSUES

This monthly review, produced by IOM, provides a summary of news related to the implementation of the Peace Accord in Colombia, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Presented on the first two pages are a summary of statistics on former child soldiers and adults in the process of reintegration, with information provided by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN).

### DISENGAGED CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

**Reported cases of forced recruitment since 1999:**

- **Total:** 7,593

**31 December**

**Total disengaged**

- **Since 1999:** 6,615
- **This year:** 8
- **This month:** 8
- **Currently enrolled in program:** 220

### Disengagement by department

**This year**

- **Antioquia:** 3
- **Nariño:** 2
- **Unknown:** 3

### Armed group

**Since 1999**

- **FARC:** 3,878
- **ELN:** 1,174
- **AUC:** 1,055

**This year**

- **OAG-SP:** 5
- **BACRIM:** 3

**This month**

- **OAG-SP:** 5
- **BACRIM:** 3

*Organized Armed Groups- splinter groups; includes FARC dissident groups*

Since 1999

- **MALE:** 71%
- **FEMALE:** 29%
- **AFRO-COLOMBIAN:** 7%
- **INDIGENOUS:** 11%
- **NON ETHNIC MINORITY:** 82%

January 2019 (This month)

- **MALE:** 75%
- **FEMALE:** 25%
- **AFRO-COLOMBIAN:** 38%
- **NON ETHNIC MINORITY:** 62%

*Note: The category of Afro-colombian has only been recorded since July 2008; thus, the proportion is expected to be higher than presented in the “Since 1999” graph.*
### Adults in Reintegration Process

**Total currently active in reintegration process:**
- **6,543**

**Total entered into ARN reintegration route**
- This month: **47**
- This year: **47**
- Since 1999: **60,386**

**State of all participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not able to locate</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet part of program</td>
<td>5,423</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In process</td>
<td>6,543</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formally removed</td>
<td>16,985</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successfully Completed</td>
<td>24,196</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>6,257</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Demobilization by Department (top 8)**

- **Valle del Cauca**: 6
- **Meta**: 3
- **Antioquia**: 4
- **Norte de Santander**: 4
- **Chocó**: 3
- **Bogotá**: 4
- **Risaralda**: 3

### Since 1999

**Armed group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>19,579</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>35,883</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACRIM</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER GROUPS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**This year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
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</tr>
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<td>BACRIM</td>
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**This month**

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<td>OTHER GROUPS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Current occupation**

- **Unemployed**: 8%
- **Employed in formal sector**: 22%
- **Employed in informal sector**: 48%
- **Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc)**: 21%

*Note: Those who have died or who are without occupational registry are not included.*
A report delivered to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) by the Attorney General’s Office on 10 January shows that the FARC was primarily financed by drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and illegal mining. A second report shows that of the 139 investigations into assassinations under Law 600, only 43% have received sentencing, and of the 45 under Law 906, 77% are still in the inquiry stage, indicating high levels of impunity. The regions with the greatest number of victims were Antioquia (134), Bogotá (75), and Arauca (53), and 78.54% of victims were men. Of the 1,602 people identified as responsible, 484 were State agents (primarily from the Army), and 452 were from illegal armed groups; 200 have been sentenced.

The 40-day period set for the United States to provide the JEP with its evidence was extended by 20 days after it emerged that the US Department of Justice had not received the original notification sent in December, another blow to the JEP’s fragile legitimacy. Jesús Santrich was captured for drug trafficking last April and has been unable to take up his seat in Congress as a result. His seat is one of the 10 places guaranteed for the FARC political party through the Peace Accord.

Iván Márquez, who left his Territorial Training and Reincorporation Space (ETCR) six months ago, emerged in a video on 12 January in which he stated that the weapons laid down for peace are now being used against social leaders and former combatants, the JEP had been “destroyed” in failing to consider intellectual authors, and the FARC should have kept their weapons as a guarantee of their economic, social, and political reincorporation, although he concluded by sharing his continued commitment to the peace process.

Márquez’s claims were rebuffed by the GOC with suggestions that he had abandoned his responsibilities to former combatants and peace, and calls for him to report to the JEP and participate in the process.

As of 16 January, 11,675 people had been brought within this transitional justice mechanism, including 9,687 former FARC combatants and 1,938 members of the Public Forces. The JEP has received 168 reports and has opened five cases: kidnapping by the FARC; extrajudicial killings or “false positives” by Public Forces; and consequences in Urabá, southern Nariño, and Cauca. The JEP will help clarify what happened and sentence those responsible over the next 15 years. On 21 January, the JEP called on the 31 members of the FARC leadership to give evidence on the 6,162 events covered by Case 001. The leaders are required to appear in person between 14 February and 27 May. The participation of the four leaders who have left their ETCR is of concern. The JEP announced 22 checks to be carried out on “El Paisa’s” commitments to the peace process, including the possible regrouping and arming of FARC structures that operated under him, his whereabouts, and his activities in the Miravalle ETCR, where he was leading the reincorporation of almost 250 former combatants until April 2018. The verification proceedings will take 30 days, after which the JEP will have 10 days to decide whether he has fulfilled his commitments.

The ELN also denounced GOC bombardments and responsibility in the deaths of social leaders, but authorities continue investigating the death of a soldier shot in Norte de Santander, and the possible involvement of the ELN in the assassination of six social leaders and 12 former FARC combatants, for which the Attorney General’s Office released 18 and 26 arrest warrants respectively. The ELN was also suspected of involvement in attacks against the Caño Limón-Coveñas petroleum pipeline on 5 and 8 January.

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The 17-January car bomb killed 21 police academy students, prompting President Duque to officially end peace talks with this guerrilla group. Duque also reactivated the arrest warrants against their 10 negotiators, refusing to recognize the security protocols to bring them back to Colombia, and insisting that the delegation be handed over to the Colombian justice system. The ELN, in turn, has claimed that the academy was a legitimate target, being a “military facility.” The ELN expanded into 19 new municipalities over 2017-18, gaining fragile control over territories previously occupied by the FARC. However, it is still a relatively small-scale guerrilla organization, with just over 3,000 combatants implementing 400 actions per year; it is also competing for territorial control with other illegal armed groups which have greater financial resources and powers of intimidation. The GOC’s primary military objective for the first time, and has increasingly strained relations with its grassroots. The six rounds of talks completed before their suspension in August 2018 resulted in agreements on an agenda, guiding principles, several ceasefires, preparatory meetings for civil society participation, and protocols for a bilateral ceasefire.

The Security Council, which met on 24 January, offered condolences for those affected by the 17-January ELN attack on a police academy in Bogotá, and reiterated how important the end of the conflict with the FARC was. They also expressed their hope that the “Peace with Legality” Stabilization Policy issued by the GOC in December would provide security, stability, and development for the areas most affected by the conflict, and called on the GOC to coordinate with Peace Accord institutions and initiatives. They also called for rapid actions to be taken at the territorial level to address the assassinations of social leaders and former combatants and to provide protection and ensure the full reincorporation of the FARC. The Council emphasized their continued commitment, and the importance of the international community, to supporting and encouraging the implementation of the Peace Accord.

This move was prompted by reports that 172 social leaders were assassinated over 2018, and 10 more over the first two weeks of 2019. This mechanism, created by the Peace Accord with the FARC, is responsible for criminal policy to tackle threats against social leaders and human rights defenders, as well as for dismantling criminal organizations. The CNGS met twice under Santos, but had not been convened since Duque took office in August 2018. Calls were also made for it and the GOC’s Timely Action Plan for the Protection of Leaders (PAO) to coordinate with other protection and security entities. According to a report covering the period 2011 to 2017, assassinations increased after the FARC’s final ceasefire in December 2014, and have largely occurred in areas previously controlled by the FARC and close to other illegal groups, while declining where illegal groups operated in the absence of the FARC; they also increased in areas where justice is most questioned. Most leaders were killed because of land, and community leaders are the principal victims; criminal organizations were involved in 65% of assassinations.

These stories, compiled by the National Centre for Historical Memory (CNMH), illustrate the challenges faced by diverse religious groups operating in rural communities during the conflict. Since the 1950s, armed groups have targeted faith groups in their attempts to fragment community cultural and social structures, propagating fear, mistrust, and the reproduction of violence. The database compiled by the CNMH includes 589 cases of violence against faith communities and their leaders between 1982 and 2012, including 29 assassinations. These actions have largely remained unrecognized despite being documented and denounced at the national and international levels, a situation which this report seeks to rectify by presenting these stories of non-violent resistance and social fabric reconstruction by faith communities, thus diversifying the voices contributing to historical memory.

In the mid-1970s, more than 18,000 ha were dedicated to growing poppy for heroine production in Thailand; by 2002, the United Nations declared the country “free” from illicit crops. This article (and the seminar it accompanies) by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz looks at these results to see how Thailand addressed its illicit crops and what Colombia could learn from their experience with alternative development. Their key findings show that 1) The solution to illicit crops requires time (30 years in the case of Thailand); 2) Responses need to be sequenced, allowing the gradual transition to alternative crops to bear fruits before eradication policies are implemented; 3) The focus should be on improving the quality of life of communities that depend on illicit crops, including alternative income generation and integrated development which strengthens infrastructure, value chains, and community leadership and sustainability; 4) Alternative livelihoods should be connected to the protection of the environment; 5) Value chains and market diversification are key to achieving equity and reducing reliance on illicit crops.