DISENGAGED CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

Reported cases of forced recruitment since 1999:

- Total: 7,616

28 February

Disengagement by department

This year

Antioquia 3
Chocó 1
Meta 2
Nariño 2

Unknown 11

Disengaged children and adolescents

Total disengaged

- Since 1999: 6,629
- This year: 22
- This month: 14
- Currently enrolled in program: 225

Armed group

Since 1999

- FARC 3,878
- ELN 1,180
- AUC 1,055

This year

- OAG-SP* 14
- ELN 4
- BACRIM 4

This month

- OAG-SP* 9
- ELN 4

*Note: The category of Afro-colombian has only been recorded since July 2008; thus, the proportion is expected to be higher than presented in the “Since 1999” graph.

Sex

- Female 29%
- Male 71%

Ethnicity*

- NON ETHNIC MINORITY 82%
- AFRO-COLOMBIAN 14%
- INDIGENOUS 11%
- 7%

Age

- 9 to 12 28%
- 13 17%
- 14 18%
- 15 28%
- 16 17%
- 17 7%
- 18 7%

*Organized Armed Groups- splinter groups; includes FARC dissident groups
ADULTS IN REINTEGRATION PROCESS

**Total currently active in reintegration process:**
- 6,579

**Total entered into ARN reintegration route**
- This month: 23
- This year: 73
- Since 1999: 60,424

**State of all participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th>1,013</th>
<th>2%</th>
<th>Not able to locate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,441</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Not yet part of program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,579</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>In process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,923</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Formally removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,208</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Successfully Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,260</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Demobilization by Department (top 7)**

- Bolivar: 3
- Antioquia: 2
- Santander: 3
- Arauca: 2
- Valle del Cauca: 3
- Bogotá: 5
- Narino: 2

**Armed group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since 1999</th>
<th>FARC: 19,585</th>
<th>AUC: 35,887</th>
<th>BACRIM: 10</th>
<th>OTHER GROUPS: 544</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This year</td>
<td>FARC: 18</td>
<td>ELN: 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This month</td>
<td>FARC: 7</td>
<td>ELN: 11</td>
<td>BACRIM: 4</td>
<td>OTHER GROUPS: 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** FARC who demobilized as part of the Peace Accord are not included in this data.

**Since 1999**

- **Sex**
  - MALE: 87%
  - FEMALE: 13%
  - MALE: 78%
  - FEMALE: 22%

- **Age at recruitment**
  - UNDER 18: 5%
  - 18 TO 25: 36%
  - 26 TO 35: 47%
  - 36 TO 45: 3%
  - 46+: 5%

- **Type of demobilization**
  - INDIVIDUAL: 46%
  - COLLECTIVE: 54%

- **Current occupation**
  - Unemployed: 8%
  - Employed in formal sector: 22%
  - Employed in informal sector: 48%
  - Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc): 21%

**February 2019 (This month)**

- **Sex**
  - MALE: 78%
  - FEMALE: 22%

- **Age at recruitment**
  - UNDER 18: 5%
  - 18 TO 25: 37%
  - 26 TO 35: 32%
  - 36 TO 45: 26%
  - 46+: 5%

**Current occupation**

- Unemployed: 8%
- Employed in formal sector: 22%
- Employed in informal sector: 48%
- Economically inactive (for age, disability, etc): 21%

*Note: Those who have died or who are without occupational registry are not included.*
“Rodrigo Cadete” and nine other combatants were killed during a military operation in Caquetá,1 making “Gentil Duarte” the only remaining figure with the political profile to hold the movement together. Despite State military successes, splinter structures now number over 1,000 combatants,2 and uncertainty surrounding Peace Accord implementation (including the assassination of 84 former combatants, and the funding of only 36 of the 292 collective projects) may cause their ranks to swell.3

Although Duque has until 11 March to decide, his delay has prolonged the JEP’s legal uncertainty and further challenged its legitimacy, despite the Law already being approved by the Constitutional Court,11 and petitions being made by 227 victims’ associations. 12 Duque’s party has shown continued commitment to changing the Peace Accord, with reduced budgets and a lack of specific funding for peace mechanisms in the NDP, near-constant attacks against the JEP, and reticence towards integrated rural reform13 and crop substitution.14

The State Council denied the former FARC leader habeas corpus, while the JEP extended the deadline15 for receiving the United States’ evidence on whether the drug trafficking for which he was arrested in April 2018 occurred before the signing of the Peace Accord.16 The GOC seeks his extradition, while the case is often cited as evidence of the lack of legal guarantees for former FARC combatants.17

Only two of the 24 remaining Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces (ETCR) have collective productive projects to replace the GOC basic salary and provisions after the 15 August cutoff, and calls have been made to accelerate their approval, ensure sustainability, purchase land, and develop markets for former combatants’ goods and services.4 The National Reincorporation Council (CNR) approved two productive projects on 25 February, and their US$645,000 budget will benefit 80 former combatants, families, and communities. To date, 185 projects have been approved.4

Rodrigo Londoño was the first to give evidence in the illegal retentions case, followed by “Pablo Catatumbo,” and “Pastor Alape,” with the remaining 28 scheduled to appear before 27 May.7 In these obligatory hearings, the FARC leadership will provide voluntary individual and collective information on 6,162 kidnappings, murders, and forced disappearances.7 To date, 89 victims have been accredited and assigned lawyers for participation in this case, through which they will be able to give evidence and respond to that given by the FARC, as well as attend subsequent public recognition audiences and comment on inquiries and FARC-proposed restorative projects.8

The National Development Plan (NDP) reduced funding for the 97,000 families signed up to the National Integrated Illicit Crop Substitution Program (PNIS) by 35%, and removed the possibility of signing new agreements to reach the original target of 130,000 families. The GOC has also set a forced eradication target of 280,000 ha, including a potential return to aerial fumigations, raising concerns over increasing violence in coca-growing regions.10 The United Nations has visited 87,000 PNIS families, finding high levels of fulfillment, with 27,555 ha already having been voluntarily removed.10

The 170 municipalities most affected by the armed conflict and prioritized for the implementation of 16 Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET) have now formulated their projects. The Territorial Renovation Agency (ART) has brought together more than 200,000 social, government, and business representatives, resulting in more than 33,000 initiatives for implementation over the next 10 years. These projects, which will benefit 6.6 million people, primarily address rural education and early childhood, economic revival and agricultural and livestock production, infrastructure and land adaptation, drinking water, rural healthcare, reconciliation, coexistence, and peace.18 Decisions on which projects will be implemented and how they will be funded still have to be made.19

ELN attacks and recruitment and GOC military operations increased after peace talks officially ended in January20, raising concerns over worsening security and displacements.21 The GOC has refused to recognize the security protocols for the safe return of ELN negotiators,22 and President Duque has made the handing over of those responsible for the 17-January attack in Bogotá a third condition for the
According to this report by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), the ELN attack on a police academy in Bogotá on 17 January has revived the specter of “terrorism,” a weapon which has been used by diverse groups throughout recent history. This report examines the motives, effectiveness, and appropriateness of policies in the “war against terror” around the world, suggesting that terrorist acts have largely been employed in asymmetrical and irregular wars, where the weaker side uses it to show their capacity to destabilize and, often, to press for changes to political regimes. International responses have tended to politically and economically exclude groups employing such actions, leading to the stigmatization of nationalist, rebel, and insurgent groups, whilst generating negative implications for ethnic groups.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

International community calls for show of peace in conflict with ELN

The EU Special Envoy for the peace process in Colombia called on the ELN to show its willingness to end the conflict, while countries including Cuba, Norway, and Germany called on President Duque to fulfill the security protocols signed by the Santos administration for the safe return of ELN negotiators. During a visit of the Norwegian Prince to the ETCR in Meta, the Ambassador reiterated Norway’s commitment to a negotiated end to the conflict and highlighted the implications that ignoring the security protocols could have for future peace processes.

INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS

Concerns for peace in National Development Plan (NDP)

The NDP, which was presented to Congress on 6 February, is criticized for focusing on military and agroindustrial consolidation at the expense of victims’ reparation and Peace Accord implementation. It also promotes “cluster” development and property regularization rather than Integrated Rural Reform; outlines Strategic Integrated Intervention Areas (ZEII) which may compete with the PDETs; lacks a specific additional Peace Accord and gender approach budget; focuses on demobilization above collective reincorporation; and foresees reparation for 282,000 fewer victims than the previous NDP. However, the GOC is considering extending the Victims’ Law, which is set to expire in July 2021.

GOC responses to assassinations, disappearances, and displacements

Despite entering a post-conflict phase, 566 leaders have been assassinated in Colombia since 2016, impunity remains at 95 percent, forced displacements continue, and paramilitary structures are present in 27 departments (up from 15 in 2006). Social organizations have also denounced forced disappearances and shortcomings in GOC responses (including support for the Missing Persons Search Unit, UBPD, and preventive policy). In response, President Duque announced the “Defense and Security Policy,” focusing on dissuasion and strengthened intelligence and international and civilian cooperation, as well as continuing implementation of the Timely Action Plan (PAO) to protect social leaders. The PAO has been criticized for its militarized approach, particularly with the continued involvement of Generals implicated in “false positives” and the stigmatization of social leaders.

DIVERSITY ISSUES

Increasing violence in northern Cauca

The Nasa communities of northern Cauca decided to remove coca and marihuana crops from their territories at the beginning of February, leading to conflicts with armed groups in the region. Meanwhile, the Indigenous movement’s mandates for the defense of life and the prohibition of weapons contradict with the National Protection Unit, leading Indigenous leaders to call for a differential approach to protection in their territories. Violence in the region has centered around confrontations between the ELP and FARC splinter groups, which have caused mass displacements and prompted the Guardia Indígena to set up control posts. The ELN is also present in the region, and threats have been circulated by the Águilas Negras, Rastrojos, Clan del Golfo, and Cartel de Sinaloa. The confrontations and threats against leaders (20 percent of all violent acts against leaders in the country occurred in the region, and 40 percent of those were against Indigenous leaders), have shattered the relative peace which accompanied the withdrawal of the FARC after the signing of the Peace Accord, and have largely targeted those defending ethnic and collective rights, involved in crop substitution and Peace Accord implementation, and participating in alternative political processes. The perpetrators have not been identified in at least 72.5 percent of these crimes.

FURTHER READING

Terrorism: Notes for a better understanding

According to this report by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), the ELN attack on a police academy in Bogotá on 17 January has revived the specter of “terrorism,” a weapon which has been used by diverse groups throughout recent history. This report examines the motives, effectiveness, and appropriateness of policies in the “war against terror” around the world, suggesting that terrorist acts have largely been employed in asymmetrical and irregular wars, where the weaker side uses it to show their capacity to destabilize and, often, to press for changes to political regimes. International responses have tended to politically and economically exclude groups employing such actions, leading to the stigmatization of nationalist, rebel, and insurgent groups, whilst generating negative implications for ethnic groups.